TITLE: MALAWI-MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS: ARGUE FOR, OR AGAINST, THE VIEW THAT MALAWI ENDED UP AS THE PARIAH STATE IN HER RELATIONS WITH MOZAMBIQUE FROM THE 1960S TO THE EARLY 1990S

TITLE: MALAWI-MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS: ARGUE FOR, OR AGAINST, THE VIEW THAT MALAWI ENDED UP AS THE PARIAH STATE IN HER RELATIONS WITH MOZAMBIQUE FROM THE 1960S TO THE EARLY 1990S

BY RICHARD CHIROMBO

MALAWI-MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS FROM THE 1960S TO EARLY 1990S: HOW MALAWI ENDED UP AS THE KEY, RATHER THAN PARIAH, STATE

INTRODUCTION
Two momentous developments took place between 1960 and the late 1980s, namely: Malawi’s attainment of independence from Britain in 1964 and the end of the Cold War between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. This changed the course of Malawi’s foreign policy. Under the leadership of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Malawi’s foreign policy position was inclined towards the western capitalist states. This stance was viewed as realism (Patel and Hajat in Patel and Svasand 2007:379). With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist ideology, Malawi’s foreign policy entered a phase of accommodation. While much has been written about the country’s foreign policy approaches, much of the focus has been put on the country’s relationship with apartheid and colonial regimes such as South Africa and Portugal. It has further been suggested that Malawi’s collaboration with South Africa fuelled the civil war in Mozambique, leading to assertions the country ended up as a pariah state, especially for supporting the activities of RENAMO,a proxy of the South Africa apartheid regime. However, the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines a pariah as an outcast, a person who is not acceptable to society and is avoided by everyone. This paper attempts, in the context of this definition, to argue that Malawi ended up as the key, rather than pariah, state, in Southern African Development Coordination Committee (SADCC) peace and economic initiatives. We also consider foreign policy practices of most African states at the time, characterized by African states eager to get rid of the colonialism hangover and fast track development initiatives to live up to the term ‘independence’, capitalized on economic rather than political diplomacy, or both. Tangible social-economic benefits were, during the period spanning from early 1960s to early 1990s, the millionaire’s cabbage around which the victorious nationalist leaders built people’s confidence and ensured their political survival. This was a period when most African leaders, including those belonging to the Front Line States, lived under the fear of being overthrown or undermined. Like all African states, Malawi did not inherit a silver spoon from the colonialists. Instead, Africa’s victorious nationalists inherited blank development cheques and maps. Malawi utilized foreign policy practices that were commonplace, including in developed countries, raising the big question of how, of all the countries employing similar strategies, only Malawi should be singled out and name-called. From the evidence presented, it is clear that Malawi was not a pariah state through out the period in question. In fact, the country was the key state in crucial regional development programmes. Whenever needed, Malawi played noble roles, including during the formation of a joint security committee to tackle armed bandits in both Malawi and Mozambique. It is unlike the work of a pariah state.

An examination of the relationship between Malawi and neighbouring countries shows that it was realistic. In other words, it was based more on benefits and costs than camaraderie. As in every nation state, Malawi’s foreign policy worked as an instrument that aimed at maximizing actual benefits in the relationship. Such purposeful approach by a state is what led Hans Morgenthau (1965: 8) to argue that political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success. In Malawi, one finds a rational government working with countries that could facilitate quick-fire development without affecting relationships with neighbouring states. Banda, knew this pretty well and made sure that, if not in good terms, at least the lines of communication were kept open. This is the opposite of a pariah state.
It can be argued that Banda’s perception of foreign policy was enshrouded by the drive to overcome Malawi’s land-locked status challenges through efficient transportation links, soft loans on infrastructural development, and cooperation as one way of expanding the country’s access to foreign markets. The Front Line States could not provide this. Again, Malawi was not the only nation to benefit from South Africa. A good case in point is that of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. In 1963-64, South Africa developed the idea of a commonworth of independent states in southern Africa under South Africa’s leadership. Through the new Bantu Homelands Development Corporation, these countries were in 1965 offered South African aid. Relations proved closest with the new government of Lesotho under Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan, but this did not make these states pariah. From 1965, South Africa provided state development loans for industrial development in the Portuguese southern African colonies and Malawi. Both South Africa and SADCC states were craving for Malawi’s attention, which turned the country into a key, other than pariah, state.

Malawi’s conception of bilateral relations then was in line with the realist theory of international politics in which interest becomes the defining factor of relations between states (Morgenthau, 1965). In the same vein, the Rational Actor Model supports Banda’s choice of expanding and improving Malawi’s development standing in Southern Africa. As has been alluded to above, an environment of suspicion and mistrust existed among the new states, to the effect that nations were doing in darkness what they were condemning in broad daylight. Zambia is a good case in point.

After the 1986 meeting of Front Line States, which run from August 21-22 in Luanda, the states demanded that Malawi adopt a new position on peace in Mozambique. On September 11, Mozambican president Samora Machel, Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda and Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe traveled to Blantyre to explain to president Banda that the fundamental interests of the Malawian people were no different from those of other SADCC states, and that possible retaliation of the Front Line States would seriously affect Malawi’s land and air communication. Despite being part of this delegation, which only warned Malawi and never imposed any sanctions to turn it into a pariah state, Zambian president Kaunda sent a secret envoy to Pretoria in 1967, beginning a dialogue by private correspondence. Thus the understanding of foreign policy is made difficult by the discrepancy between what statesmen say they are doing and what they actually do (Morgenthau, 1962:1). However, what is wanted in foreign policy is realism and imagination, flexibility and firmness, vigour and moderation, continuity of policy when policy is good and the ability to change direction when international conditions make new departures desirable, adaptability of policy without destruction of its coherence or dependability (Waltz, 1967). Kaunda’s decision is a sign that Malawi made the right choice.

As has been observed, there are many aims that diplomacy has to pursue, one of which is political. The state must ensure peace and good relations with neighbouring countries. The visit of Mugabe, Machel and Kaunda on September 11, 1986 shows that Malawi was open to discussions. Then comes the issue of traditional or political diplomacy. According to Deputy Minister in the Office of the President and Cabinet, Nicholas Dausi, traditional or political diplomacy was the reason behind Malawi’s choice to forge relationships with South Africa and Portugal. Dausi said the trait of traditional diplomacy helped in bringing development to other countries such as Mozambique. He cited the railway to Beira as one of the examples, saying it was Malawi which convinced Portugal to go ahead with it despite its high costs. His sentiments were echoed by historian Desmond Dudwa Phiri, who said Malawi played a crucial role to end the Mozambique war and deserved better than being labeled a pariah state.

It must also be noted that though Malawi and Mozambique are neighbours (Mozambique lies on the East Coast of Africa, bordered to the North by Tanzania, to the West by Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, and to the South by Swaziland and South Africa), the two nations came from different backgrounds. Mozambique had been a Portuguese colony since the 19th century (Europa, 1990) while Malawi had been a British colony. Mozambique only got independence in 1975. The two nations’ priorities were bound to be different, more so when Malawi leaned towards capitalism while Mozambique favoured socialism as evidenced by the fact that the ruling FRELIMO party in that country benefited greatly from Marxist intellectuals, especially after Samora Machel took over from Eduardo Mondlane (Europa, 1990), who was murdered in Dae es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1969.

Diplomacy, defined as the conduct of business or the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between Governments of independent States, played a huge role in making sure that the country did not become a pariah state, as witnessed by visits from regional leaders such as Mugabe, Kaunda and Machel. In the study of international politics, foreign policy encompasses the substance and content of external relations while diplomacy entails the methodology for implementing foreign policy (Krishnamurty, 1980; Bull, 1977; Satow, 1966). More over, Malawi’s policies fitted those used in international politics of the time, which leads to the conclusion that Malawi could not be branded as a pariah state when it was merely applying commonly used theories to spearhead development. It must also be noted that by the early 1950s, theoretical battles were being fought over “idealism” versus “realism” with keystones of the gospel of realism centering on nation power, nation interest and balance of power as two major approaches to how states control themselves in their interactions (Rourke and Boyer, 2004; Kegley, JR., 1995; Bennett, 1991; Rosenau, 1969; Morgenthau, 1965).

Idealism or neo-idealism is the expression of the ultimate values of freedom, peace, welfare, justice, and security, although these goals are not accepted in the same manner and with the same meanings by all states (Padelford and Lincoln 1967:49) but is a tool to increase state wealth and power(Morgenthau,1965). Thus through idealism states basing on their realist conception compete with each other for limited goods: territory, status, prestige, access to raw materials and markets, and control over strategic points. Thus the reality of diplomacy is that the gains of one state are at the expense of the others, and no state can afford to rely on others for its security and welfare (Holsti, 1995:6). The problem, however, is that studies that show how diplomacy shape the peoples’ mindsets in safeguarding the national sovereignty and resources against foreign exploitation in Malawi are rare.

Christopher Clapham (1996) argues that the foreign policy behaviour of different African states varied enough to indicate that the rulers could make real choices, for example as between ‘Capitalist’ and ‘Socialist’ strategies of economic development, and the international alignment that went with them. He argues that from the view point of rulers such as Houphouet-Boigny in Cote d’Ivoire or Kamuzu Banda in Malawi, the search for economic support dictated a clientelist approach. Until the failure of African economies brought about the imposition of structural adjustment programmes, and with the end of the Cold War revealed the vulnerability of African states to direct external intervention (Clapham 1996:65, 245). However, what approach dictated Malawi’s foreign policy between early 1960s to early 1990s has not been seriously analysed by scholars of Malawian foreign policy and diplomacy. But, definitely, it did nor lead to Malawi’s exclusion,

As it were, the end of the Cold War marked the death of the Banda doctrine of sticking to capitalist rather than socialist approaches for economic support. The world without the Cold War presented countries such as Malawi an opportunity to spread their diplomatic nets to non democratic allies and accommodated countries such as South Africa. The only problem in Malawi position could be national consultation. While most analyst of foreign policy and diplomacy argue that (it) foreign policy must be controlled by the people (Palmer & Perkins, 2004; Waltz, 1967; Nicolson, 1963) and that its conduct must adhere to certain sound principles and rules, prove its consistency with democratic tradition and the imperative effective negotiation (Palmer & Perkins, 2004; Krishnamurty, 1980; Nicolson, 1963 Macridis, 1962). However, diagnosis of the execution of foreign policy and conduct of diplomacy in Malawi as evidenced by the embracing of apartheid regimes all feed into agreed conduct of diplomacy and that clear Malawi from allegations of being a pariah state. In all this, Malawi managed to harmonise the theoretical and practical conceptions on the conduct of diplomacy, which should be aimed at the fulfillment of the national interest and secure protection of the citizenry from vulnerability of external forces (Palmer &Perkins, 2004; Rourke and Boyer, 2004; Krishnamurty, 1980; Keohane & Nye, 1977; Morgenthau, 1962).

It could be argued that those who claim that Malawi ended up as a pariah state do so for lack of other terms. After all, one of the problems countries have had with Malawi’s foreign policy has been their inability to separate political from economic or ideological determinants or what could be termed as acting in national interest. For instance, it is difficult to identify and differentiate what is acting on national, political and economic interest since Malawi got independent. This challenge is well highlighted by Larkin (1971) and Hutchinson (1975). Both authors cite the example of China as one of the victim’s of Malawi’s policies from 1964 to 2007. They argue that Dr. Banda is said to have rejected Chinese economic assistance of £6 million or £18 million to support the Chinese in the United Nations rather than recognize Taiwan (Larkin 1971, Hutchinson, 1975). Banda had told the United Nations in 1964 that, since the People’s Republic of China exercised effective authority over his territory Malawi had no choice but extent diplomatic relations. However, in twist of events, on 12 July 1966, Malawi extended de jure recognition to Taiwan (Larkin, 1971: 185). Examining Banda’s behaviour through his foreign policy actions becomes complex to categorize his kind of diplomacy as either economic diplomacy or development diplomacy or political diplomacy. The diplomatic strategies of African leaders such as Banda generated analytical problems in African foreign policy. This led Cowan to argue that foreign policies of African states have been to a degree characterized by ad-hoc decision-most of which owing to the absence of foundations on which to base an overall foreign policy, which tended at times to be contradictory and often confusing to the outside observer (Mckay 1966:119).

When Malawi applied these ideals in terms of her economic development needs, observers mistook it for the signs of a pariah state. Yet Malawi kept the channels of communication open to Mozambican officals, resulting into that joint committee to deal with bandits. Malawi that housed Mozambican refugees, a sure sign of good neighbours. Differing in diplomatic partners does not turn a country into an isolated state. Take for instance countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe. The two had China as their ally, Mozambique still looked up to Portugal and Malawi Britain, South Africa and Portugal. Why is it that it is only Malawi that is being singled out for being different. Observers seem to forget that there is unity in diversity.

Another example could be the tendency of countries that were in SADCC, most of which could openly grant political asylum to exiled individuals from member states. It was like harbouring bandits because the exiled leaders could plan against their governments. But did did not make such states pariah. Mayall (1971) argues that in Southern Africa there was a tendency for the opposition to move abroad and identify itself with the foreign policy aims of the neighbouring state. He points out that following the Malawi cabinet crisis in September1964, six former ministers fled into exile in neighbouring Tanzania and Zambia where they were granted political asylum and, according to Malawi’s President Banda, official support in plotting his overthrow. Thus, since the Tanzanian government was deeply committed to the liberation struggle and had provided training and base facilities for nationalist freedom fighters engaged in Mozambique, and since Zambia was generally believed to be following a similar, if less openly provocative policy the presence of political exiles from Malawi inevitably led to the conflict between the three states. Both Larkin (1971) and Hutchinson (1975) point out that Banda had alleged that the political exiles camping in neighbouring countries to Malawi and plotting his assassination were aided by the People’s Republic of China. They further contend that when the Chinese realized that Banda could not succumb to the blandishment of six million or eighteen million pounds to recognize China, there was all possibility that the Chinese could sponsor his overthrow in favour of the opposition. In rejecting Chinese aid, Banda argued that the overpopulated China was looking enviously at Africa’s huge resources and if the Africans were blind and not careful the Africans would be served up as Chinese soup (Hutchinson, 1975: 272).

In conclusion, we have seen from this paper that, rather than playing isolationist politics that would have turned Malawi into a pariah state, the country utilized foreign policy strategies available between early 1960s to early 1990s, most of whom policies are still highly valued by United Nations member states. We have also seen that, other than being isolated, Malawi engaged in a sustained programme of dialogue with Front Line States as well as SADCC members, a development that helped avert disaster, bring the civil war in Mozambique to an end, promoted regional integration, increased turned the Southern Africa region into one powerful voice in terms of inter-regional negotiations. In all this, Malawi played a crucial role. This role was further appreciated by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe on May 23, 2009, when he thanked Malawi for her efforts in aiding the guerrillas in Zimbabwe. Some three month earlier, former Mozambican President Joachim Chissano told former Ghanaian President, John Kufuor, about how Malawi allowed them to operate in Chilobwe, Blantyre. A host of African heads of state attended the funeral of Malawi’s former President, Dr. Banda. All these point to the fact that Malawi ended up as a key, rather than pariah, state in the region.








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