African Mythology As A Form Of Discourse

By Richard Chirombo

African Mythology constitutes a discourse because myths, by their nature, are narratives that serve to connect individuals to their culture by explaining nature and supernatural phenomena¹ in a carefully structured manner that conceals real meaning.

Michel Foucault, who is variously regarded as a philosopher, social theorist, cultural historian and an historian of political thought, captures this  aspect very well when he implies that mythologies and other forms of narratives are forms of discourse in the sense that there are subtle rules and, therefore, hidden meaning below the surface of their seemly harmless message, observing thus: “They (ordinary people) have probably found it difficult enough to recognise that their history, their economics, their social practices, the language (langue) that they speak, the mythology of their ancestors, even the stories that they were told in their childhood, are governed by rules that are not all given to their consciousness (…)”². In other words, “things and events” will only become discourse “in the unfolding of the essential secrets. Discourse is no longer much more than the shimmering of a truth about to be born in its own eyes; and when all things come eventually to take the form of discourse, when everything may be said and when anything becomes an excuse for pronouncing a discourse, it will be because all things having manifested and exchanged meanings, they will then all be able to return to the silent interiority of self-consciousness^”3.

In fact, the link between mythology and discourse becomes more pronounced when the term ‘discourse’ is defined. For instance, Bertrand and Hughes (2005) define discourse as an organised series of statements about the natural and social world which have, over a period of time, become formalised into ‘rules’ which govern the behaviour of members of a social or cultural field, operating through architecture, habit, practices and ethics to permit or constrain behaviour thereby shaping the individual sense of self⁴. A Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory, on the other hand, defines discourse as ‘talk’ or ‘conversation’ with the hint of a ‘didactic’ purpose⁵, acknowledging, however, that  this definition rather contradicts the word’s etymology, going back to the Latin verb discurrere, which means ‘to run about’, ‘range widely’, ‘wander off course’, among others. In both cases, language is used to deduce meaning.

More importantly, mythology shares the features of discourse in the sense that the narratives’ arrangement is not arrived at by chance, but is purposefully arranged to control people. For example, Seymor Chatman⁶captures this aspect well when he proposes that a narrative must have both story- which he describes as the content, the events and existents it talks about, the ‘what?’- and discourse, “the way in which it is told, the selection and ordering of events and existents, the ‘how’”- further observing that, “For, though a narrative must have a beginning, a middle and an end, they need not always be presented in that order. From this perspective, story is potential, discourse is actual; story elements (plot, functions, characters) are predictable whereas discourse provides variety/surprise. Indeed, literary critic Mark Shorer emphasises this point by analysing the function of myths in society, observing that, “Myths are the instruments by which we continually struggle to make our experience intelligible to ourselves. A myth is a large, controlling image that gives philosophical meaning to the facts of ordinary life”⁷.

However, it must be borne in mind that it is not always true that all narratives are discourse. For instance, while a number of scholars and theorists have described narratives as a form of discourse, this school of thought is not always true because some narratives have varied meanings in various societies. “There is no fixed meaning to any narrative, therefore, and it is always open to multiple interpretation”⁸. Therefore, to brand all narratives as discourse is to deny the “plural quality” of various writings.

Additionally, even Foucault himself recognises the fact that there is “false” and “true” discourse when he observes, thus; “A division emerged between Hesiod and Plato, separating true discourse from false ; it was a new division for, henceforth, true discourse was no longer considered precious and desirable, since it had ceased to be discourse linked to the exercise of power”⁹. It must be noted, however, that Foucault used ‘true’ and ‘false’ in the ironic sense, by which he means that ‘false’ discourse which is not linked to the exercise of power.

More importantly, to always link the term discourse to the exercise of power constitutes flawed reasoning because it presupposes that power only invoke discourses as a covert means of cultivating, or exercising power. To the contrary, some myths relate to sacred history; that is, a primordial event that took place at the beginning of time, ab initio¹⁰.

This, notwithstanding, both mythology and discourse share similar attributes. For example, myths have the attribute of discourse in the sense that discourse is the form myths use to portray a message, while the combination of words in the narrative is, in no way, haphazard. They are, in fact, carefully woven. Discourse, too, shares the same attributes. Foucault aptly observes thus, “I am supposing that in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality¹¹.”

However, it must be noted that discourse often takes the form of ideology, dogma or doctrine. In analysing the impact of doctrine on  ”subjects”, Foucault notes that doctrine, as a tool of exercising power, effects a dual subjection, that of speaking subjects to discourse, and that of discourse to the group, at least virtually, of speakers¹². This implies that subjects are not in control of their lives; instead, they are “determined” by language, referring to how “(…) historically and culturally located systems of power/knowledge construct subjects and their worlds”¹³. Indeed, the use of language to subtly convey dominant ideologies and imperialistic goals has been a topic for debate for a long time.

Ngugi wa Thiong’o, for example, observes that every language has two aspects. “One aspect is its role as an agent that enables us to communicate with one another in our struggle to find the means for survival. The other is its role as a carrier of the history and the culture built into the process of that communication over time.¹⁴” This holds true for Africa, where former colonial powers lay hold on the continent by imposing their ideologies through language. In fact, ideology assisted in reproducing “colonialist relations through the strategic deployment of a vast semiotic field of representations- in literary works, in advertising, in sculpture, in travelogues, in exploration documents, in maps, in pornography, and so on.¹⁵”

Therefore, it is imperative that, in order to recapture the culture and history carried by Africa’s original “culture and history carried by these languages (…) thrown onto the rubbish heap and left there to perish”¹⁶, literary works such as narratives taking the form of myths should be revived by being told in their original languages. This brings us back to the point that African Mythology constitutes a discourse, more so when the ‘subtle’ agenda behind revitalisation of such myths is to ‘reclaim’ the culture and history that were thrown onto the rubbish heap.

Moreover, myths, more than the other narratives has the unique characteristic of being composed by a number of individuals, thereby cementing the possibility of their utilisation as a discourse. More so because, “Unlike a story composed by a single author, a myth always stands on its own, with a  plot and a set of characters easily recognised by those who listen to the story-teller, poet, or dramatist making use of it”¹⁷, thereby bringing “divinity into focus. And their subject matter inevitably touches upon the nature of existence, the world over which the gods rule”.

Therefore, myths can be a powerful tool in reversing the cultural and historical damage inflicted on Africa by the ‘invisible’ hand of language. It goes without saying that disciplinary power “is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility”¹⁸. In the case of Africa, this compulsory visibility was achieved through ideologies imposed in the choice of national language imposed by the conquering masters.

However, turning myths into an ideological vehicle in Africa faces the inevitable challenge that, as in all cases where ideologies are being passed through narratives (discourses) such as myths, there are always differences in expertise over a subject among people. In which case, “members are able to speak or act (only) on the basis of the acquired ideology, but are not always able to formulate its beliefs explicitly”¹⁹.

END NOTES

1. Arthur B. (1995) Cultural Criticism: A Primer of Key Concepts (vol. 4.) Sage Publications : California.  P. 122

2. Michel F. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language. Tavistock Publications Limited: New York. P. 210-211

3. Ibid, p. 228

4. Ina B., and Peter H. (2005) Media Research Methods: Audiences, Institutions, Texts published by Palgrave MacMillan. New York. p.166

5. A Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory (2^nd Ed.) (2010) Wiley-Blackwell. West Sussex

6. Seymour C. (1978) Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film. Cornell University Press. Ithaca (Cited in Bertrand and Hughes, ibid, p.212)

7. Arthur Asa Berger, ibid, page 122

8. Stuart S., and Borin L. (2004) Introducing Critical Theory. Icon Books Limited. London. P. 56

9. Foucault, Ibid. p. 218

10. Berger, ibid. p. 122

11. Foucault, p. 216)

12. Foucault, p. 226

13. Gubrium, J.F. and Holstein, JA (2000) Analysing Interpretive Practice in Denzin and Lincoln (eds) (2000) pp. 487-508 (quoted in Bertrand and Hughes. P. 167)

14. Ngugi T. (1993) Moving the Centre: The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms. East African Educational Publishers. Nairobi. P. 483

15. Ashcroft, B., Gareth H.T. (1995) The Post-Colonial Studies Leader. Routledge. London. p. 47

16. Ngugi T. ibid. p. 50

17. Arthur C. (2005)World Mythology (1^st Ed.) Paragon Publishing. London: p.5

18. Arthur C. ibid. p.6

19. Foucault, M. (1995) Discipline and Punish and The Birth of the Prison. Vintage Books. New York. p. 187